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Understanding Peer Effects:
On the Nature, Estimation,
and Channels of Peer Effects
Jan Feld, Victoria University of Wellington
Ulf Zölitz, Behavior and Inequality Research Institute (briq),
IZA, and Maastricht University
This paper estimates peer effects in a university context where stu-
dents are randomly assigned to sections.While students beneﬁt from
better peers on average, low-achieving students are harmed by high-
achieving peers. Analyzing students’ course evaluations suggests
that peer effects are driven by improved group interaction rather
than adjustments in teachers’ behavior or students’ effort. Building
on Angrist’s research, we further show that classical measurement
error in a setting where group assignment is systematic can lead to a
substantial overestimation of peer effects. However, when group as-
signment is random—like in our setting—peer effect estimates are bi-
ased toward zero.
I. Introduction
The promise of the peer effects literature is to provide policymakers with
advice that can be used to increase overall performance by simply reorga-
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nizing peer groups. When looking at the by now substantial number of
published articles that estimate peer effects in education, it becomes appar-
ent that the literature has not yet delivered on this promise. This can be seen,
for example, in the recent review by Sacerdote (2011), who shows that size,
and even the sign of peer effects estimates, notably differ between and even
within primary, secondary, and postsecondary education.
One potential reason why peer effects estimates are so varied is that there
are a number of social and statistical forces that lead to similar outcomes be-
tween peers, even in the absence of causal peer effects (Manski 1993; Angrist
2014). Two well-known challenges to the identiﬁcation of peer effects are
the selection and reﬂection problems. The selection problem states that peer
groups are usually formed endogenously and that it is empirically difﬁcult
to distinguish peer effects from selection effects. The reﬂection problem
states that it is impossible to distinguish the effect of peers on the individual
from the effect of the individual on peers if both are determined simulta-
neously. A number of recent peer effects studies (Lyle 2007; Carrell, Ful-
lerton, andWest 2009;Duﬂo,Dupas, andKremera 2011;Carrell, Sacerdote,
and West 2013) have convincingly addressed the selection and reﬂection
problems by studying peer effects in a setting where students are exoge-
nously assigned to peer groups and by using pre-treatment characteristics
as measures for peer ability. Even these estimates, however, might be biased
due to a mechanical relationship between the measures of own and peer
ability, as described in Angrist (2014). The nature of this bias is still poorly
understood.
In the analytical part of this paper, we build on Angrist (2014) to analyze
the role of measurement error in the estimation of peer effects. We show
that classical measurement error—which is usually associated with attenu-
ation bias—can lead to overestimation of peer effects. We ﬁnd that the size
and direction of this bias depends on the true underlying peer effect and the
group assignment mechanism.We show, both analytically and usingMonte
Carlo simulations, that in settings where peers are randomly assigned, clas-
sical measurement error will only lead to attenuation bias. With systematic
student assignment, however, measurement error can lead to substantial
overestimation of peer effects. This bias is distinct from selection bias.
Besides estimation bias, the large heterogeneity in peer effect estimates
might reﬂect that peer effects are generated by mechanisms that are highly
Schippers from the School of Business and Economics (SBE) at Maastricht Univer-
sity Scheduling Department, Sylvie Kersten from the SBE Exams Ofﬁce, and Jean-
nette Hommes and Paul Jacobs from the Educational Research and Development
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SophiaWagner for providing excellent research assistance. Contact the correspond-
ing author, Ulf Zölitz, at zoelitz@iza.org. Information concerning access to the data
used in this article is available as supplementary material online.
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context speciﬁc. Take, for example, adjustment of teachers’ behavior as one
potential channel of peer effects. While Duﬂo et al. (2011) have shown that
this channel matters in Kenyan classrooms, it is irrelevant in the settings
where peer groups have no common teachers, as in living communities
(see Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 2003; Lyle 2007; Carrell et al. 2009,
2013). A better understanding of the channels that drive peer effects could
lead to a better understanding about why they differ across contexts. So far,
there exists only limited empirical evidence on the channels of peer effects.1
In the empirical part of this paper, we estimate peer effects in academic
achievement in a setting where peers are randomly assigned to sections at
the university level. The data consist of all students enrolled at the School
of Business and Economics (SBE) at Maastricht University and their grades
over a period of 3 years, which amount to 7,672 students and 39,813 grades.
Course participants are assigned to sections, groups of 10–15 students, who
spend most of their contact hours together in one classroom. Our measure
of student performance is course grades. Following the standard approach
in the literature, to avoid the reﬂection problem, we use a pre-treatment in-
dicator of peer quality: the past grade point average (GPA) of the peers. To
identify potential nonlinearities in peer effects, we estimate heterogeneous
effects in terms of student and peer achievements. Finally, we use data on
students’ individual-level course evaluation to shed some light on which
channels might be driving the observed peer effects in our setting.
Our results for the linear-in-means speciﬁcation show that being assigned
to a section with, on average, higher-achieving peers increases students’
grades in that course by a statistically signiﬁcant but small amount. A one
standard deviation increase in the average peer GPA causes an increase of
1.26%of a standard deviation in student grades. This result, however,masks
important heterogeneity: low-achieving students are actually harmed by
high-achieving peers. Analyzing students’ course evaluations, we ﬁnd sug-
gestive evidence that the main channel of the observed peer effects is im-
proved group interaction. We ﬁnd no evidence for an adjustment in teacher
behavior or student effort driven by the section peer composition.
Taken together, this article makes two main contributions. First, our dis-
cussion of the role of measurement error in the estimation of peer effects
sheds light on a potential threat to the identiﬁcation of peer effects that has
so far been poorly understood. Second, we provide clean estimates of peer
effects using a large data set of randomly assigned students.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II builds on
Angrist (2014) to analyze how measurement error biases the estimation of
peer effects. Section III describes the institutional environment studied and
1 See, e.g., Duﬂo et al. (2011) for evidence on channels in primary education;
Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser (2012) in secondary education; and Booij, Leuven,
and Oosterbeek (forthcoming) in postsecondary education.
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the assignment procedure of students into sections. Section IV discusses the
data set. Section V provides evidence that the assignment to sections is ran-
dom, conditional on scheduling constraints. Section VI discusses the empir-
ical strategy and the results. Section VII investigates the underlying chan-
nels using students’ course evaluations. Section VIII concludes.
II. Measurement Error and the Estimation of Peer Effects
In a recent overview, Angrist (2014) discusses many threats to the iden-
tiﬁcation of peer effects. In particular, he shows, building on earlier work by
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), that measurement error can lead to overesti-
mation of peer effects.2 This might seem counterintuitive since measure-
ment error is usually associated with attenuation bias. The key problem
in this context is that measurement error in own ability will automatically
lead to measurement error in measured group ability because it is an ag-
gregate of the individual ability measures. Since ability will always be mea-
suredwith some error, a typical peer effects regressionwill thus contain two
mismeasured independent variables, which makes the direction of the bias
unclear. We phrase the discussion below in terms of the estimation of peer
effects, but it generalizes to other settings where one independent variable
is the group average of anothermismeasured independent variable.3 In these
settings, measurement error can lead to an upward bias in the group average
coefﬁcient.
We believe Angrist has uncovered an important source of bias that de-
serves further investigation, since he does not explicitly show under which
assignment mechanisms an upward bias exists or how the magnitude of this
bias depends on the underlying parameters. In this section, wewill therefore
ﬁrst review Angrist’s decomposition of the peer effects coefﬁcient. Then,
expanding upon this, we will show how classical measurement error can
lead to overestimation of peer effects. Finally, we use Monte Carlo simula-
tions to show how the size of this bias varies under different peer assign-
ment regimes.
A. Decomposition of the Peer Effects Estimator
Consider the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model:
yig 5 m 1 p0xi 1 p1xg 1 yi, (1)
2 See also Mofﬁtt (2001) and Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) for a discussion
on the role of measurement error in the estimation of peer effects.
3 The problem we describe here for the estimation of peer effects also arises in
other contexts, for example, when including both own household income and the
average household income in a geographic area in the same regression. Whenever
“own status” and some group average of this status are included in the same regres-
sion, measurement error can lead to upward bias in the estimated group coefﬁcient.
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where yig is the grade of student i in group g, xi is themeasure of student abil-
ity, xg is the average of xi in group g, yi is an error term, and E½yijxi 5
E½yijxg 5 0. For simplicity, wewill discuss group averagemeasures of abil-
ity as opposed to the leave-out means (i.e., the group average excluding stu-
dent i) as this distinctionmatters little econometrically. In particular,Angrist
(2014) has shown that the peer effects estimator, whenusing leave-outmeans
instead of group averages, differs only by a factor ofNg=ðNg 2 1Þ, whereNg
is the size of group g. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) have shown that in this
setup, the population parameter p1 is equal to
p1 5 fðwIV 2 wOLSÞ ≈ wIV 2 wOLS, (2)
where wOLS is equal to the population coefﬁcient from a bivariate regression
of yig on xi and wIV is the population coefﬁcient of ability in a two-stage least
squares IV regression of yig on ability using group dummies as instruments
for ability. Here f 5 1=ð1 2 R2Þ, where R2 is the R-squared from the ﬁrst
stage of the above IV regression.4 As thisR-squared is typically close to zero,
the peer effects estimator is approximately equal to the difference between
the IV and OLS estimators of grades on own ability.
One can see from equation (2) that not only peer effects but all factors
that lead to a difference between wIV and wOLS will affect p1. We will focus
here on measurement error in xi as a plausible reason why wIV and wOLS
would differ even in the absence of peer effects.5 But how can measurement
error lead to an overestimation of peer effects? The intuition behind this is
as follows. If there is measurement error in xi, both wIV and wOLS are atten-
uated, that is, biased toward zero. When student assignment to peer groups
is systematic, wIV is, in the absence of actual peer effects, less attenuated than
wOLS, which leads to an overestimation of peer effects. While Angrist also
argues that the direction of the bias depends on the assignment mechanism,
he is—probably due to the condensed nature of his overview—not explicit
on why this is the case. We show this bias analytically in the next section.
B. Measurement Error and Bias of p1
We model the grade data-generating process as follows:
yig 5 d 1 b0x
*
i 1 b1x*g 1 ui, (3)
where yig is the grade of student i in group g, x*i is student i’s latent ability, x*g
is the group average of x*i in group g, d is a constant, b0 is the causal effect of
ability on grade, and the parameter of interest, b1, is the causal effect of
4 Deﬁnitions of wOLS, wIV, and R
2 can be found in Appendix Section A1.1.
5 Angrist further mentions weak instrument bias: if students are randomly as-
signed to groups an IV with a weak ﬁrst stage might bias wIV toward wOLS, which
would bias peer effects estimates toward zero.
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group average ability on grade. We, however, only observe a noisy measure
of individual ability, xi 5 x
*
i 1 εi, where εi is classical measurement error,
which has a mean of zero and is independent of x*i ,  x*g and ui. Measurement
error in themeasure of individual ability will automatically lead tomeasure-
ment error in the measure of group ability, so xg 5 x*g 1 εg, where x*g and εg
are the respective averages of x*i and εi in group g. To focus this discussion
on the role of measurement error, we assume that E½uijx*i  5 E½uijx*g  5 0,
which means that if we would perfectly observe x*i and x*g (i.e., if εi5 0), p1
would be equal to b1.6 We take equation (2) as a starting point and further
decompose the peer effects estimator given the deﬁnition of variables and the
data-generating process deﬁned above. For brevity, we do the analytical step-
by-step decomposition in Appendix Section A1.1, where we show that
p1 5 b1f
Varðx*g Þ
VarðxgÞ
2
Varðx*g Þ
Var xið Þ
 !
1 b0f
Varðx*g Þ
VarðxgÞ
2
Var x*i
 
Var xið Þ
 !
: (4)
Note thatf, which is equal to 1=ð1 2 R2Þ, is always larger than one and usu-
ally close to one. We deﬁne W ; Varðx*g Þ=VarðxgÞ 2 Varðx*g Þ=VarðxiÞ and
Q ; Varðx*g Þ=VarðxgÞ 2 Varðx*i Þ=VarðxiÞ and can thus rewrite equation
(4) like this:
p1 5 b1fW 1 b0fQ: (5)
We show in Appendix Section A1.2, that without measurement error
p1 is equal to b1. We further show that fW will always range between 0
and 1, and in the case of random assignment to peer groups, it will be equal
to the test reliability of ability Varðx*i Þ=VarðxiÞ. So fW alone would only
lead to an attenuation of p1. To understand any potential upward bias of
p1, we need to understand the relationship between the ratio of variances
of latent to measured group average ability Varðx*g Þ=VarðxgÞ and the ratio
of variances of latent to measured individual ability Varðx*i Þ=VarðxiÞ in Q.
When all individual ability measures have the same variance, we can re-
write Q as (see Appendix Section A1.2):
Q 5
Var x*i
 
Var x*i
 
1 Var εið Þ
11 Ng21ð Þrð Þ
2
Var x*i
 
Var x*i
 
1 Var εið Þ
, (6)
6 Note that throughout this paper we understand ability very broadly as all stable
factors that inﬂuence grades, including innate ability, motivation, and access to ac-
ademic resources.
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where r is the average correlation of the distinct student abilities in group g,7
and Var(εi) is the variance of the measurement error.
Understanding the role of r is central in understanding a potential up-
ward bias in p1. Importantly, when students are randomly assigned, r will
be zero, and the ﬁrst and second terms of equation (6) will be equal in size.
This means thatQwill be zero and p1 will be attenuated. When students of
similar ability tend to be grouped together, r will be positive, and the ﬁrst
term of equation (6) will be larger than the second one; hence,Qwill be pos-
itive. In this case—assuming that the effect of own ability on grade b0 is pos-
itive—p1 will be upward biased in the absence of peer effects. Given that r is
positive, the bias will increase with the group sizeNg. Note that a positive r
can also be driven by nonrandom grouping at a higher level. In our setting,
for example, students’ course selection is nonrandom, while assignment to
sections within courses is random. Fortunately, including course ﬁxed ef-
fects eliminates this problemby taking out the correlation of individual abil-
ities, which is driven by systematic assignment of students to courses.8
Figure 1 visualizes our analyticalﬁndings by describing the bias as a func-
tion of the true peer effects for different values of r. To get an idea about the
potential size of the bias, we use plausible values for the variables and pa-
rameters in equation (4). In particular, we set Varðx*i Þ 5 1 and VarðεiÞ 5
1=9 to obtain a high test reliability of 0.9, which is approximately the test
reliability of the SAT for measured ability (College Board 2014). The effect
of own ability on grade b0 is set to 0.6, which is approximately equal to the
coefﬁcient of the measure of own ability in our setting. We also assume that
own ability, peer ability, and grade are measured with the same scale, so we
can compare the magnitude of the bias with typical peer effects estimates
from the review of Sacerdote (2011). For r5 0, as is the case under random
assignment, peer effect estimates are attenuated. For r > 0, peer effects esti-
mates are upward biased in the absence of peer effects, and this bias declines
as peer effects increase.
The overall direction of the bias depends on whether the upward bias
caused by b0fQ exceeds the attenuation bias caused by b1fW (see eq. [5]).
The potential magnitude of the bias is substantial: in the absence of peer ef-
fects, for example, and with a group assignment that leads to r 5 0.1, OLS
7 More speciﬁcally,
r 5
1
Ng Ng21
 oNgi≠j Cov x*i , x*j
 
Var x*i
  :
8 When including course ﬁxed effects, eq. (4) holds if we replace xi with the re-
siduals of a regression of xi on course dummies, ~xi, throughout. Note that ~xi is the
ability measure demeaned at the course level (see Frisch and Waugh 1933; Angrist
2014).
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estimates would, on average, wrongly suggest that a one point increase in
peer ability leads to an approximately 0.04 point increase in grade. This bias
would be even larger formore noisy abilitymeasures: a test reliability of 0.6,
for example, would lead to an upward bias of approximately 0.12. Differ-
ences in measurement error, degree of assortative assignment, and group
size between studies can thus contribute to the large heterogeneity in peer
effects estimates through the mechanism described above. For comparison,
the linear inmeans peer effects estimates reported in the review by Sacerdote
(2011) range from 20.12 to 6.8, with a median of 0.3.9
C. Results from Monte Carlo Simulations
To conﬁrm our analytical results, we estimate equation (3) using Monte
Carlo simulations.10 We use the same values for variables and parameters as
for ﬁgure 1,11 and we show how results vary by the student assignment
9 This refers to the peer effects estimates for primary and secondary schools re-
ported in table 4.2 in Sacerdote (2011).
10 Information concerning the Stata Do-ﬁle of this simulation is available in a zip
ﬁle online.
11 Thismeans that b05 0.6, ability x*i ∼ Nð0, 1Þ, measurement error ε1 ∼N(0, 1/9),
and group ability x*g and its measure xg are calculated as laid out above. We set the
error term of the model to ui ∼ Nð0, 1Þ.
FIG. 1.—Bias as a function of the actual peer effects for different values of r. This
ﬁgure is based on equation (4), with b0 5 0:6, Varðx*g Þ 5 1, and VarðεiÞ 5 1=9.
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mechanism. In particular, we simulate an environment with 1,500 students,
who are divided into 10 courses. Each course has 10 sections, and each sec-
tion has 15 students. To see how estimates depend on the true peer effect, we
set b1 to 0 and 0.3. We test three different assignment mechanisms: (i) ran-
dom assignment to courses and sections, (ii) assortative course assignment
and random section assignment, and (iii) random course assignment and as-
sortative section assignment. Assortative assignment here means that stu-
dents are assigned (or self-select) to peers with similar abilities. Under the
random assignment, r is approximately 0, and assignment mechanisms 2
and 3 lead to a r of approximately 0.1. The assortative assignment of stu-
dents to sections is based on one variable that is correlated with ability. In
practice, this “assignment variable” may or may not be observable to the
researcher.
Table 1 shows the average difference between estimated and actual peer
effects—an indication of the estimation bias—using OLS estimation with
1,000 Monte Carlo replications. The ﬁrst rows of panels A, B, and C show
that peer effect estimates are unbiased in the absence of measurement error
for all assignment mechanisms. This conﬁrms that the bias discussed here is
not driven by selection bias in the classical sense.
The second rows of panels A, B, and C show the results with measure-
ment error. All results conﬁrm our analytical discussion. Under random as-
signment to courses and sections, measurement error leads to attenuation
bias (see cols. 3 and 4 of panel A). With assortative assignment, however,
peer effects are overestimated (see cols. 1 and 3 of panels B and C). The size
of the bias is as predicted by our analytical results: in the absence of peer ef-
fects, for example, and with course or section assignment that leads to a r5
0.1, the bias is approximately 0.04 (see col. 1 of panels B and C). As ex-
pected, the inclusionof courseﬁxedeffects eliminates theupwardbias caused
by assortative assignment to courses, and peer effects estimates are then at-
tenuated (see col. 4 of panel B).
In many practically relevant settings, nonrandom assignment to sections
(i.e., the peer group of interest) is likely to lead to a positive r. In the (rare)
case where this assortative assignment is based on an observable assignment
variable, controlling for this variable eliminates the potential upward bias.
Estimates will again be attenuated (see col. 4 of panel C). This applies, for
example, when students are tracked within schools based on past perfor-
mance observable to the researcher. In this case, controlling for students’
past performancewill eliminate the potential upward bias by themechanism
described above.
Given that ability can only be measured with some degree of error, these
ﬁndings have different implications for studies from nonexperimental and
(quasi-)experimental settings. Because innonexperimental settings assortative
assignment is likely, measurement error can lead to an upward bias on top of
any potential selection bias. Studies that use data from (quasi-)experimental
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settings, on the contrary, do not have these problems. It has been alreadywell
established that random assignment or systematic assignment based observ-
ables eliminates selection bias. We have now added to this by showing that
in these settings measurement error will only lead to attenuation bias. In the
remainder of this paper, we will present new evidence on the structure of
peer effects in a setting where students were randomly assigned to university
sections.
III. Background
A. Institutional Environment
The data we collected for this paper come from the School of Business
and Economics (SBE) of Maastricht University, which is located in the
south of the Netherlands.12 Currently there are approximately 4,200 stu-
dents at the SBE enrolled in bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD programs. Be-
cause of its proximity to Germany, the SBE has a large German student
population (53%) mixed with students of Dutch (33%) and other national-
ities. Approximately 37% of the students are females. The academic year
at the SBE is divided into four regular teaching periods of 2 months and
two skills periods of 2 weeks. Students usually take two courses at the same
time in the regular periods and one course in the skills period. We exclude
courses in skills periods from our analysis because these are often not graded
and because we could not always identify the relevant peer group.13
The courses are organized by course coordinators, mostly senior staff,
and many of the teachers are PhD students and teaching assistants. Each
course is divided into sections with a maximum of 16 students. These sec-
tions are the peer group on which we focus. The course size ranges from
1 to 638 students, and there are from 1 to 43 sections per course. The sec-
tions usuallymeet in twoweekly sessions of 2 hours each.Most courses also
have lectures that are followed by all students in the course and that are usu-
ally given by senior staff.
The SBE differs from other universities with respect to its focus on Prob-
lemBased Learning (PBL).14 The general PBL setup is that students generate
questions about a topic at the end of one session and then try to answer these
questions through self-study. In the next session, the ﬁndings are discussed
with other students in the section. In the basic formof PBL, the teacher plays
12 See also Feld, Salamanca, and Hamermesh (2016) for a detailed description of
the institutional background and examination procedure at the SBE.
13 In some skills courses, for example, students are scheduled in different sections
but end up sitting together in the same room. Furthermore, skills courses have no
exam at the end of the skill period, and in many skills courses, students do not re-
ceive a GPA-relevant grade but only a “pass” or a “fail” grade.
14 See http://www.umpblprep.nl/ for amore detailed explanation of PBL atMaas-
tricht University.
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only a guiding role, and most of the studying is done by the students in-
dependently. However, courses differ in the extent to which they give guid-
ance and structure to the students, depending on the nature of the subject
covered, with more difﬁcult subjects usually requiring more guidance, and
the preference of the course coordinator and teacher.
Compared to the traditional lecture system, the PBL system is arguably
more group focused, because most of the teaching happens in small groups
inwhich group discussions are the central part of the learning process.Much
of the students’ peer interaction happens with members of their section,
either in the sessions or while completing homework and in study groups.
B. Students’ Course Evaluations
Twoweeks before the exam, students are invited by e-mail to evaluate the
courses they are currently taking in an online questionnaire.15 Students re-
ceive up to three e-mail reminders, and the questionnaire closes before the
day of the exam. Students are assured that their individual answers will not
be passed on to anyone involved in the course. The teaching staff receives no
information about the evaluation before they have submitted the ﬁnal
course grades to the examination ofﬁce.16 This “double blind” procedure
is implemented to avoid a situation where either of the two parties retaliates
with negative feedback in the form of lower grades or evaluations. The exact
length and content of the online questionnaires differ by course. The ques-
tionnaire typically contains 19–25 closed questions and two open-ended
questions. For our analysis, we use the nine core questions that are assessed
inmost courses that allow us to investigate the effect of peers on group func-
tioning, student effort, and teacher functioning. These questions ask stu-
dents about how they perceived the instructor, howmany hours they stud-
ied for the course, and about the interaction with their fellow students. Data
on students’ course evaluations at the individual level were provided by the
Department of Educational Research and Development of the SBE. The
course evaluation data are described in greater detail in Section VII.
C. Assignment of Students to Sections
TheSchedulingDepartmentof theSBEassigns students to sections, teach-
ers to sections, and sections to time slots. Before each period, there is a time
frame inwhich students can register online for the courses theywant to take.
After the registration deadline, the scheduler is given a list of registered stu-
dents andallocates the students to sectionsusingacomputerprogram.About
10% of the slots in each group are initially left empty and are ﬁlled with
15 For more information, see the course evaluation home page: http://iwio-sbe
.maastrichtuniversity.nl/default.asp.
16 After exam grades are published, teaching staff receive the results of the course
evaluations aggregated at the section level.
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students who register late.17 This procedure balances the amount of late reg-
istration students over the sections. Before the start of the academic year
2010–11, the section assignment for master’s courses and for bachelor’s
courses was conducted with the program Syllabus Plus Enterprise Time-
table using the allocation option “allocate randomly” (see ﬁgure A1 in the ap-
pendix). Since the academic year 2010–11, all bachelor’s sections have been
stratiﬁed by nationality with the computer program SPASSAT.18 Some
bachelor’s courses are also stratiﬁed by exchange student status. After the
assignment of students to sections, the sections are assigned to time slots,
and the program Syllabus Plus Enterprise Timetable indicates scheduling
conﬂicts.19 Scheduling conﬂicts arise for approximately 5% of the initial as-
signments. If the computer program indicates a scheduling conﬂict, the
schedulermanuallymoves studentsbetweendifferent sectionsuntil all sched-
uling conﬂicts are resolved. After all sections have been allocated to time
slots, the scheduler assigns teachers to the sections.20 The section and teacher
assignments are then published. After publication, the scheduler receives in-
formation on late-registering students and allocates them to the empty slots.
The schedulers do not know the students nor do they observe their previous
grades.
Only 20–25 students (less than 1%) ofﬁcially switch sections per period.
Switching sections is possible only through a student advisor and is allowed
only for medical reasons or due to a conﬂict with sports practice for stu-
dentswho are on a list of top athletes.21 Students sometimes switch their sec-
17 About 5.6% of students register late. The number of late registrations in the
previous year determines the number of slots that are initially left unﬁlled by the
scheduler.
18 The stratiﬁcation goes as follows: the scheduler ﬁrst selects all German stu-
dents (who are not ordered by any observable characteristic) and then uses the op-
tion “Allocate Students set SPREAD,” which assigns an equal number of German
students to all classes. Then the scheduler repeats this process with the Dutch stu-
dents, and the scheduler ﬁnally distributes the students of all other nationalities to
the remaining spots.
19 There are four reasons for scheduling conﬂicts: (i) the student takes another
regular course at the same time; (ii) the student takes a language course at the same
time; (iii) the student is also a teaching assistant and needs to teach at the same time;
and (iv) the student indicated nonavailability for evening education. By default, all
students are recorded as available for evening sessions. Students can opt out of this
default position by indicating this in an online form. Evening sessions are scheduled
from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., and approximately 3% of all sessions in our sample are
scheduled for this time slot.
20 Approximately 10% of teachers indicate time slots when they are not available
for teaching. They do so before they are scheduled, and the signature of the depart-
ment chair is required.
21 We do not have a record for these students and therefore cannot exclude them.
However, section switching in these rare cases is mostly due to conﬂicts with med-
ical and sports schedules and therefore unrelated to section peers.
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tion unofﬁciallywhen they have extra appointments. This type of switching
is usually limited to one session, and students rarely switch sections perma-
nently.22
There are some exceptions to this general procedure, which are described
in Appendix Section A3. After removing these exceptions, neither students
nor teachers, and not even course coordinators, have any inﬂuence on the
composition of the sections in our estimation sample.
IV. Data
We obtained data for all students taking courses at the SBE during the ac-
ademic years 2009–10, 2010–11, and 2011–12. Scheduling data were pro-
vided by the Scheduling Department of the SBE. The scheduling data in-
clude information on section assignment, the allocated teaching staff, and
the day of the week and the time of day the sessions took place, as well as
a list of late registrations for our sample period. In total, we have 7,672 stu-
dents, 395 courses, 3,703 sections, and 39,813 grades in our estimation sam-
ple. Panel A of table 2 provides an overview of courses, sections, and stu-
dents in the different years.23
The data on student grades and student background, such as gender, age,
and nationality, were provided by the Examinations Ofﬁce of the SBE. The
Dutch grading scale ranges from 1 to 10, with 5.5 being the lowest passing
grade.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of ﬁnal grades in our estimation sample.
Theﬁnal course grade is often calculated as theweighted average ofmultiple
graded components, such as the ﬁnal exam grade, a participation grade, a
presentation grade, or a midterm paper grade.24 The graded components
and their respective weights differ by course, with most courses givingmost
of the weight to the ﬁnal exam grade. If the ﬁnal course grade of a student
after taking the ﬁnal exam is lower than 5.5, the student fails the course and
has the option of taking a second and third attempt at the exam.We observe
ﬁnal grades after each attempt separately. For our analysis, we use only the
ﬁnal grade after the ﬁrst exam attempt as an outcomemeasure because ﬁrst-
and second-attempt grades are not comparable.25 For the construction of
22 It is difﬁcult to obtain reliable numbers on unofﬁcial switching. From our own
experience and consultation with teaching staff, we estimate that session switching
happens in less than 1% of the sessions, and permanent unofﬁcial class switching
happens for less than 1% of the students.
23 We refer to each course-year combination as a separate course, which means
that we treat a course with the same course code that takes place in 3 years as three
distinct courses.
24 We excluded 36 courses in which part of the ﬁnal grade might have consisted
of group-graded components from the estimation sample (see Sec. IV.C).
25 The second-attempt exam usually takes place 2 months after the ﬁrst exam.
400 Feld/Zölitz
This content downloaded from 131.220.115.229 on January 29, 2018 03:51:33 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
T
ab
le
2
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
St
at
is
ti
cs
P
an
el
A
A
ca
de
m
ic
Y
ea
r
N
um
be
r
of
C
ou
rs
es
N
um
be
r
of
U
ni
qu
e
St
ud
en
ts
N
um
be
r
of
Se
ct
io
ns
A
ve
ra
ge
N
um
be
r
of
St
ud
en
ts
pe
r
Se
ct
io
n
N
um
be
r
of
G
ra
de
s
20
09
–
10
11
0
3,
81
9
1,
13
4
13
.2
1
11
,9
25
20
10
–
11
14
1
4,
01
8
1,
34
6
13
.0
8
13
,7
68
20
11
–
12
14
4
4,
13
1
1,
22
3
14
.1
8
14
,1
20
A
ll
ye
ar
s
39
5
7,
67
2
3,
70
3
13
.5
0
39
,8
13
P
an
el
B
M
ea
n
SD
M
in
25
p
M
ed
ia
n
75
p
M
ax
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
St
ud
en
t-
le
ve
li
nf
or
m
at
io
n:
C
ou
rs
e
dr
op
ou
t
.0
84
1
.2
78
0
0
0
0
1
43
,4
71
G
ra
de
ﬁ
rs
ta
tt
em
pt
6.
53
7
1.
88
6
1
6
7
8
10
39
,8
13
F
in
al
gr
ad
e
6.
74
5
1.
68
7
1
6
7
8
10
40
,6
01
G
P
A
6.
79
0
1.
20
6
1
6.
12
2
6.
98
3
7.
58
3
10
43
,4
71
Se
ct
io
n-
le
ve
li
nf
or
m
at
io
n:
N
um
be
r
of
re
gi
st
er
ed
st
ud
en
ts
pe
r
se
ct
io
n
13
.5
0
1.
31
7
5
13
14
14
16
43
,4
71
N
um
be
r
of
st
ud
en
ts
th
at
dr
op
pe
d
cl
as
s
2.
29
1
1.
97
7
0
1
2
3
14
43
,4
71
P
ee
r
G
P
A
6.
75
7
.4
71
4.
89
7
6.
44
1
6.
77
6
7.
09
6
8.
50
0
43
,4
71
W
ith
in
se
ct
io
n
SD
of
pe
er
G
P
A
1.
12
6
.3
65
.1
04
.8
69
1.
10
5
1.
36
0
2.
79
9
43
,4
71
St
ud
en
tb
ac
kg
ro
un
d
in
fo
rm
at
io
n:
A
ge
20
.7
4
2.
20
3
16
.1
9
19
.1
7
20
.4
2
21
.9
8
41
.2
5
40
,4
69
F
em
al
e
.3
69
.4
83
0
0
0
1
1
40
,4
69
D
ut
ch
.3
12
.4
63
0
0
0
1
1
43
,4
71
G
er
m
an
.4
96
.5
00
0
0
0
1
1
43
,4
71
B
A
st
ud
en
t
.7
93
.4
06
0
1
1
1
1
43
,4
71
B
A
in
te
rn
at
io
na
lb
us
in
es
s
.4
03
.4
91
0
0
0
1
1
43
,4
71
B
A
ec
on
om
ic
s
.2
80
.4
49
0
0
0
1
1
43
,4
71
E
xc
ha
ng
e
st
ud
en
t
.0
61
9
.2
41
0
0
0
0
1
43
,4
71
N
O
T
E
.—
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
de
sc
ri
pt
iv
e
st
at
is
tic
s
of
th
e
es
tim
at
io
n
sa
m
pl
e.
G
P
A
5
gr
ad
e
po
in
ta
ve
ra
ge
;S
D
5
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n;
B
A
5
ba
ch
el
or
’s
de
gr
ee
;2
5p
5
25
th
pe
rc
en
til
e;
75
p
5
75
th
pe
rc
en
til
e.
This content downloaded from 131.220.115.229 on January 29, 2018 03:51:33 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
the student’sGPA (grade point average), we use theﬁnal grades after the last
attempt.26
Panel B of table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for our estimation
sample. Our sample contains 43,471 student course registrations. Out of
these, 3,658 (8%) dropped out of the course during the course period.
We therefore observe 39,813 course grades after the ﬁrst attempt. The aver-
age course grade after the ﬁrst attempt is 6.54. Approximately one-ﬁfth of
the graded students obtain a course grade lower than 5.5 after the ﬁrst at-
tempt and therefore fail the course. The average ﬁnal course grade (includ-
ing grades from second and third attempts) is 6.75, and the average GPA is
6.79. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the GPAs based on ﬁnal grades.
The peerGPA is the section averageGPA excluding the grades of the stu-
dent of interest. Figure 4 shows the distribution of peer ability, measured as
the average GPA of all other students in the section.
V. Test for Random Assignment of Students to Sections
The scheduling procedure that we describe in Section III.C shows
that section assignment is random conditional on scheduling constraints.
FIG. 2.—Distribution of grades after the ﬁrst examination. A color version of
this ﬁgure is available online.
26 We decided to use the GPA calculated from ﬁnal grades because this is closer
to the popular understanding of GPA.
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FIG. 4.—Distribution of peer GPA. A color version of this ﬁgure is available
online.
FIG. 3.—Distribution of student GPA. A color version of this ﬁgure is available
online.
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Nevertheless, we test whether section assignment has the properties that
one would expect under random assignment. In particular, we would like
to test whether the section-level (pre-treatment) peer GPA signiﬁcantly
predicts students’ own (pre-treatment) GPA when controlling for course
ﬁxed effects, scheduling, and balancing indicators.27 However, such a test
is complicated by an artiﬁcial negative correlation between own and peer
GPA that exists even under random assignment. The intuition behind this
problem is that students cannot be assigned to themselves. High-ability stu-
dents therefore draw peers from a pool of lower-ability peers, which creates
an artiﬁcial negative correlation between own and peer ability. Thiswasﬁrst
described by Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009), who show that one
can correct for this negative correlation by including the leave-me-out-mean
of peer ability at the level at which the randomization takes place.We follow
their proposed solution by including the average GPA of all peers at the
course level.
Table 3 shows the results of this randomization test with different sets
of controls. In all speciﬁcations, peer GPA at the section level is not sig-
niﬁcantly related to the student’s own GPA. This conﬁrms that the assign-
ment to sections has the properties that one would expect under random
assignment.
VI. Empirical Strategy and Results
A. Empirical Strategy
We use the following model to estimate the effect of peers on grades:
Yigt 5 b1GPAi,t21 1 b2GPAg2i,t21 1 g
0Zigt 1 εigt : (7)
The dependent variable Yigt is the grade of student i, in a course-speciﬁc
section g, at time t; GPAi, t 2 1 is the past GPA of student i; and GPAg2i,t21 is
the average past GPA of all the students in the section excluding student i;
Zigt is a vector of additional controls; and εigt is an error term. In all speciﬁ-
cations, Zigt consists of dummies for day of the week and time of the day of
the sessions, German, Dutch, exchange student status, late registration sta-
tus, and year-course-period ﬁxed effects.28 In other speciﬁcations, we also
include other course ﬁxed effects—ﬁxed effects for the other course taken
at the same time—and teacher ﬁxed effects.29 Note that GPAi, t21 and
27 See Appendix Section A4 for an alternative randomization test that reaches the
same conclusion.
28 For some sections, the time and day of the sessions were missing. We include
separate dummies for these missing values.
29 Other course ﬁxed effects are only deﬁned for students who take up to two
courses per period. In only 1.5% of the cases, students were scheduled for more
than two courses, and these students drop out of our sample when we include other
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GPAg2i,t21 might measure own and peer ability with some error.
30 This
might bias our peer effects estimates through the mechanisms described
in Section II. Since group assignment is random at the section level and since
we include year-course-period ﬁxed effects, this will lead to an attenuation
of peer effects. Including stratiﬁcation controls and teacher ﬁxed effects
should increase the precision but not affect the size of the estimates. Con-
ceptually, including scheduling controls and other course ﬁxed effects
should pick up all leftover nonrandom variation in section assignment that
is due to conﬂicting schedules. To allow for correlations in the outcomes of
students within each course, we cluster the standard errors at the course-
year-period level. We standardized Yigt, GPAi,t21 and GPAg2i,t21 to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one over the estimation sample
to simplify the interpretation of the coefﬁcients.
B. Linear-in-Means Results
Before we show estimates of peer effects on grades, we check whether
peer GPA is related to course dropouts. The course dropout rate is only
8% at the SBE. OLS regressions, which we omit for brevity, show that nei-
ther average peer GPA nor the other peer GPA variables we use when es-
timating heterogeneous effects signiﬁcantly predict course dropout. We
therefore do not worry about selection bias when interpreting peer effects
estimates on grades.
Table 3
Randomization Test of Section Assignment
Own GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized average peer GPA 2.0023 2.0023 2.0048 2.0053
(.0086) (.0086) (.0088) (.0088)
Course FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scheduling controls No No Yes Yes
Parallel course FE No Yes No Yes
R2 .422 .422 .423 .441
Observations 43,471 43,471 43,471 43,471
NOTE.—The dependent variable is the standardized own GPA (grade point average) from all previous
courses. FE 5 ﬁxed effects; GPA 5 grade point average. Following Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo
(2009), all models control for the average peer GPA at the course level. All regressions include German,
Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration status. Scheduling controls include dummies for day
and time of the sessions. Parallel course ﬁxed effects are ﬁxed effects for the courses taken at the same time.
Robust standard errors clustered at the course level are in parentheses.
course ﬁxed effects. Teacher ﬁxed effects are ﬁxed effects of the ﬁrst teacher as-
signed to a session.
30 Further, note that the precision of own and peer achievement estimates in-
creases with tenure when GPAi,t 1 and GPAg i,t 1 are calculated with more past
grades. This means that we would expect any bias from measurement error to de-
crease with students’ tenure.
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Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions with the standardized grade
as the dependent variable. The table shows that being assigned to section
peers with a higher GPA causes higher course grades. The coefﬁcient of
standardized peer GPA is small but statistically signiﬁcant in all models.
The inclusion of teacher ﬁxed effects and other course ﬁxed effects hardly
changes the effect size or its standard errors. The reported estimate in the
most complete speciﬁcation in column 4 shows that being assigned to peers
with a one standard deviation higher GPA increases the student’s grade by,
on average, 1.26%of a standard deviation. The results are very similar when
we deﬁne own and peer GPA solely based on ﬁrst-year grades (see table A3
in the appendix). In terms of the Dutch grading scale, this estimate means
that, for example, an increase of peer GPA from 6.5 to 7.0 is associated with
a grade increase from 6.50 to 6.523, a small and economically insigniﬁcant
effect. It follows from our discussion in Section II that measurement error
leads to attenuation of our estimator, and this attenuation is proportional to
the test reliability of ability. To get a rough idea of the unattenuated coefﬁ-
cient, we can divide the coefﬁcient by the split-half correlation of GPA,
0.72, an estimator of the test reliability.31 This increases the estimate to
1.75% of a standard deviation.
To explore heterogeneous effects, we extend the baseline analysis by ad-
ditionally including interaction terms of peer GPAwith dummies of course
type or student gender. Table 5 shows the results of this analysis, where we
Table 4
Baseline Estimates: Linear-in-Means
Standardized Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized peer GPA .0108* .0114* .0121** .0126**
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Standardized GPA .5606*** .5605*** .5623*** .5622***
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016)
Observations 39,813 39,813 39,813 39,813
R2 .432 .441 .448 .457
Course FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Staff FE No Yes No Yes
Other course FE No No Yes Yes
NOTE.—The dependent variable is the standardized course grade. All speciﬁcations include dummies for
day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration status.
Other course ﬁxed effects refer to the course that students are taking at the same time. FE 5 ﬁxed effects;
GPA5 grade point average. Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in paren-
theses.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
31 In order to calculate the split-half correlation, we randomly assigned all past
grades of a student into two groups and constructed two GPAs based on these sub-
groups. The split-half correlation is the correlation of these ability measures.
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include the baseline results of table 4, column 4, in column 1 for compari-
son. Column 2 shows that peer effects estimates are larger for master’s com-
pared to bachelor’s courses, although the difference is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Previous studies have found that peer effects differ between
technical and nontechnical subjects.While Carrel et al. (2009) and Brunello,
De Paola, and Scoppa (2010) ﬁnd larger peer effects in technical subjects,
Arcidiacono et al. (2012) ﬁnd larger peer effects in nontechnical subjects.32
To test whether peer effects in our settings differ by course technicality, we
classiﬁed a course as “technical” if at least one of the following words ap-
peared in the course description: math, mathematics, mathematical, statis-
tics, statistical, theory focused.Doing this, we categorized 31%of the courses
as “technical.” Column 3 shows that peer effects estimates are a little bit
smaller in technical courses, but this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Column 4 shows that estimated peer effects are somewhat larger for males,
but again this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
32 Brunello et al. (2010) compare peer effects estimates in hard science and social
science majors. Carrell et al. (2009) compare peer effects in math and science with
humanities and social science courses. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) compare peer ef-
fects in humanities, social sciences, hard sciences, and mathematics, and they ﬁnd
larger effects for humanities and social sciences.
Table 5
Linear-in-Means Estimates with Course Type and Gender Interactions
Standardized Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized peer GPA .0126** .0303* .0153** .0164**
(.006) (.017) (.007) (.007)
Standardized peer GPA  Bachelor’s course 2.0207
(.018)
Standardized peer GPA  Technical course 2.0077
(.012)
Standardized peer GPA  Female 2.0080
(.011)
Standardized GPA .5622*** .5622*** .5622*** .5841***
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.017)
Female .0401***
(.012)
Observations 39,813 39,813 39,813 37,210
R2 .457 .457 .457 .475
NOTE.—The dependent variable is the standardized course grade. All speciﬁcations include dummies for
day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration status,
as well as ﬁxed effects for courses, ﬁxed effects for other courses taken at the same time, and teacher ﬁxed
effects. FE 5 ﬁxed effects; GPA 5 grade point average. Robust standard errors clustered at the course-
year-period level are in parentheses.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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C. Heterogeneity by Own and Peer GPA
The speciﬁcations in tables 4 and 5 are linear-in-mean, which implicitly
assumes that all students are linearly affected by the mean GPA of their
peers. Previous studies, however, have shown that peer effects are likely
heterogeneous with respect to both student and peer achievement (Burke
and Sass 2013; Carrell et al. 2013). We test for these two sources of hetero-
geneity simultaneously by estimating a two-way interaction model similar
to those of Burke and Sass (2013) and Carrell et al. (2013). To do this, we
classify students as high, middle, and low GPA based on whether their
GPA is in the top, middle, or bottom third of the course GPA distribution,
respectively. We then calculate for each section the fraction of peers with
high GPA and low GPA and include interactions of students’ own type
(high, middle, and lowGPA) with the fraction of high- and low-GPA peers
in the model we estimate. The coefﬁcient High GPA  Fraction of high
GPA peers, for example, can be interpreted as showing how high-GPA stu-
dents are affected by increasing the fraction of high-GPA peers in the sec-
tion while keeping the fraction of low-GPA peers constant. Put differently,
the coefﬁcient shows how high-GPA students are affected if middle-GPA
peers (the reference group) are replaced with high-GPA peers.
Table 6 shows the coefﬁcients of these six interactions. Overall, the esti-
mated effects are small in magnitude: for example, the largest coefﬁcient,
Low GPA  Fraction of low-GPA peers, suggests that an increase of 20%
in low-GPA peers, which is equivalent to replacing three out of 15 middle-
GPA peers with low-GPA peers, decreases the grade of a low-GPA student
by2.63%ofa standarddeviation.The results forhigh- andmiddle-GPAstu-
dents are in line with the linear-in-meanmodel: high- andmiddle-GPA stu-
dents are positively affected by high-GPA peers and negatively affected by
low-GPA peers. The results for low-GPA students, however, are notice-
ably different. The point estimate suggests that low-GPA students are neg-
atively affected by high-GPA peers. They are also negatively affected by
peers from their own GPA group—low-GPA peers. The effect of increas-
ing the fraction of high-GPA peers is signiﬁcantly different for low-GPA
students compared to high- andmiddle-GPA students. To visualize the het-
erogeneous results, we plot the coefﬁcients of the interactions in table 6 in
ﬁgure 5. It shows that although peer effects seem to increase linearly with
peer GPA for high- and middle-GPA students, the effect ﬁrst increases and
then decreases for low-GPA students.
These estimates are qualitatively different from the pre-treatment ﬁnd-
ings of Carrell et al. (2013), who exploit random assignment, which sug-
gested that in particular low-achieving students beneﬁt fromhigh-achieving
peers. This result, however, was not robust to an intervention in which low-
achieving students were assigned to squadrons with a large fraction of high-
achieving peers. Contrary to the predictions of their pre-treatment ﬁndings,
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but in linewith our results, low-achieving students were actually harmed by
this intervention.
VII. Channels of Peer Effects
The peer effects that we estimated in the previous sectionmight be driven
by a number of potential channels. Changes in the peer composition could
affect achievement; for example, through better group functioning, an in-
crease in student effort or adjustments in the teaching style of the teacher.
How and in which direction these channels would inﬂuence student per-
formance is a priori unclear: while better peers might induce students to
work harder (e.g., via peer pressure, higher aspirations, or social norms),
Table 6
Heterogeneous Effects
Standardized Grade
High GPA  Fraction of high-GPA peers .0410
(.053)
High GPA  Fraction of low-GPA peers 2.1047**
(.049)
Middle GPA  Fraction of high-GPA peers .0789
(.052)
Middle GPA  Fraction of low-GPA peers 2.0332
(.052)
Low GPA  Fraction of high-GPA peers 2.1449*
(.076)
Low GPA  Fraction of low-GPA peers 2.1315**
(.066)
Observations 39,813
R2 .461
F-statistic fraction of high peers (middle vs. low) 5.40**
p-value .0207
F-statistic fraction of high peers (high vs. low) 4.38**
p-value .0370
F-statistic fraction of high peers (high vs. middle) .26
p-value .6114
F-statistic fraction of low peers (middle vs. low) 1.39
p-value .2386
F-statistic fraction of low peers (high vs. low) .10
p-value .7462
F-statistic fraction of low peers (high vs. middle) 1.14
p-value .2867
NOTE.—The dependent variable is the standardized course grade. Additional con-
trols include standardized GPA, course ﬁxed effects, other-course ﬁxed effects, and
teacher ﬁxed effects, as well as dummies for day of the session, time of the session, Ger-
man, Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration status. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the course level are in parentheses. GPA 5 grade point average.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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FIG. 5.—The effect of peer fractions for students with high, middle, and low
GPAs. The data points in this ﬁgure are taken from table 5 using the fraction of
middle-GPA peers as a reference category.
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lower-performing students might be demotivated bymuch better peers and
exert less effort. Regarding the teacher behavior, we would expect teachers
to adjust to the classroompeer composition by altering the difﬁculty level of
their instructions. While an instruction level closer to the own ability level
might be beneﬁcial, larger deviations are likely to be detrimental. Such a
mechanism would imply that students beneﬁt from having more peers of
similar abilities. To explore some potential channels of the peer effects in
our setting, we investigate how peer ability affects students’ answers in the
course evaluation questionnaire.
Table 7 shows the wording and answering scales of the items regarding
group functioning, self-study hours, and teacher functioning.33 In our esti-
Table 7
Evaluation Item, Answering Scales, and Response Rates
Item Domain Item Wording
Answer
Scale
Response Rate
Conditional on
Participation (%)
1. Group interaction My tutorial group has functioned well. 1–5 94.1
2. Group interaction Working in tutorial groups with my
fellow-students helped me to better
understand the subject matters of
this course. 1–5 93.5
3. Self-study hours How many hours per week on the av-
erage (excluding contact hours) did
you spend on self-study (presenta-
tions, cases, assignments, studying
literature, etc.)? 0–80 92.8
4. Teacher functioning Evaluate the overall functioning of your
tutor in this course with a grade. 1–10 93.5
5. Teacher functioning The tutor sufﬁciently mastered the
course content. 1–5 93.6
6. Teacher functioning The tutor stimulated the transfer of
what I learned in this course to other
contexts. 1–5 93.4
7. Teacher functioning The tutor encouraged all students to
participate in the (tutorial) group
discussions. 1–5 93.0
8. Teacher functioning The tutor was enthusiastic in guiding
our group. 1–5 93.5
9. Teacher functioning The tutor initiated evaluation of the
group functioning. 1–5 91.5
NOTE.—AtMaastricht University, the teaching staff member present in the classroom is referred to as the
“tutor.” Sections are commonly called “tutorial groups.”
33 Standard items on the course evaluation questionnaire also include items about
learning material and general course evaluation. For a complete list of all the stan-
dard evaluation items and how each item relates to mean peer GPA, see table A5 in
the appendix.
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mation sample, 38% of the students start ﬁlling out the questionnaire. The
last column in table 7 shows that once students started the questionnaire,
they answered almost all of items. Answering the course evaluation ques-
tionnaire is selective. We observe, for example, that students with higher
GPAs are more likely to take part in the evaluation, and our results should
be interpreted in light of this ﬁnding. We have nevertheless chosen to ana-
lyze students’ course evaluation for two reasons. First, the survey response
is not signiﬁcantly related to peer quality asmeasured bymean peerGPAor
to the peer GPA variables used in Section VI.C (see table A4 in the appen-
dix). Second, the student evaluation data give us a unique insight into poten-
tial mechanisms in a way that is not available in most other studies. All re-
sults, however, should be interpretedwith caution, andwe interpret them as
providing suggestive evidence.
For our analysis, we aggregate items in the domains of group functioning
(two items) and teacher functioning (six items) byﬁrst summing all the stan-
dardized item answers and then standardizing the sum of these values in
each domain so that the aggregated categories have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one. Answers to the question about self-study hours,
which we use as a measure of student effort, are left in their natural unit. We
impute missing values for items that students who started ﬁlling out the
questionnaire did not answer either because the question was not in their
course-speciﬁc questionnaire or because they chose not to answer the ques-
tion.34
Panel A of table 8 shows that the average peer GPA affects the evaluation
of the group interaction positively. A one standard deviation increase in
peerGPA leads to a 0.056 standard deviation increase in evaluation of group
interaction.When redoing the analysis with each of the two items separately,
we ﬁnd that this result is only driven by the ﬁrst item (see table A5 in the
appendix). This suggests that the students notice the better group function-
ing but do not perceive higher beneﬁts from it—a result that is not surpris-
ing given the small magnitude of the estimated peer effects on grades. Hours
worked and teacher functioning are not signiﬁcantly affected by peer GPA.
Panel B shows the results using the same speciﬁcation for identifying peer
effect heterogeneity as in Section VI. This model allows us to investigate if
the effect of peer GPA on course evaluations is heterogeneous in terms of
student and peer achievement. When comparing the different evaluation
34 Conditional on answering at least one of these questions, the percentage of
missing answers is between 5.9% and 9.2% depending on the item (see table 7).
We apply multiple imputations by chained equations (MICE) with 10 cycles. Note
that imputing missing values might bias estimates if the missing at random assump-
tion does not hold. We therefore also report ranges of point estimates using bound-
ing methods in table A6 in the appendix, where we assume extreme values for miss-
ing answers. We also report results without any imputations in table A7 in the
appendix. Results are very similar across these different models.
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domains, we see that the peer variables are jointly signiﬁcant in explaining
the evaluation of the group interaction and not jointly signiﬁcant in explain-
ing the evaluation of the teacher or the self-study hours. The results for
group interaction suggest that in particular the presence of high-GPA peers
matters. The point estimate suggests that a 20% increase in high-GPA peers
increases high-GPA students’ evaluation of the group interaction by about
0.105 standard deviations. The estimated effects of increasing high-GPA
Table 8
The Effect of Peer Composition on Student Evaluations
Standardized Group
Interaction
Self-Study
Hours
Standardized Teacher
Functioning
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
Standardized peer GPA .0561*** .0339 .0017
(.015) (.092) (.013)
Standardized GPA 2.0348*** .1353 2.0426***
(.010) (.083) (.009)
Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441
Panel B:
High GPA  Fraction
of high-GPA peers .5267*** 2.4390 .0839
(.131) (.858) (.096)
High GPA  Fraction
of low-GPA peers 2.1132 2.8487 2.0893
(.121) (.852) (.101)
Middle GPA  Fraction
of high-GPA peers .2265 2.0499 2.0462
(.139) (.992) (.124)
Middle GPA  Fraction
of low-GPA peers .0202 1.8395* .0055
(.110) (.962) (.114)
Low GPA  Fraction
of high-GPA peers .2659** 2.3977 .0650
(.119) (.919) (.114)
Low GPA  Fraction
of low-GPA peers .0369 21.6370* 2.0874
(.120) (.956) (.114)
Observations 15,441 15,441 15,441
F-statistic joint signiﬁcance
of peer variables 5.60*** 1.34 .88
Prob > F .0000 .2391 .5080
NOTE.—The dependent variables are standardized group interaction in col. 1, self-study hours in col. 2,
and standardized teacher evaluation in col. 3. All speciﬁcations include course ﬁxed effects, other course
ﬁxed effects, and teacher ﬁxed effects, as well as dummies for day of the session, time of the session, Ger-
man, Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration status. All regressions reported in panel B also
include standardized GPA (grade point average). Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-
period level are in parentheses. We imputed missing values as explained in footnote 40.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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peers are also positive and about half the size for medium- and low-GPA
students, although the effect for medium-GPA students is not quite statis-
tically signiﬁcant (p-value 5 .128).
All in all, our results suggest that, in our setting, group interaction is the
most important of the three discussed channels. Interestingly, the effect of
peer quality on group interaction appears to be linear. This implies that the
inverse U-shaped pattern for low-GPA students we found in Section VII is
driven by other unobserved factors.We do notﬁnd evidence for adjustment
of teacher behavior or student effort.
Our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Booij et al. (forthcoming),
who studied peer effects in settings similar to ours, where the peer group is
deﬁned at the section level at a Dutch University. They also ﬁnd evidence
for peer effects on group functioning and no evidence of peer effects on
teacher functioning. Lavy et al. (2012) study the effect of the proportion
of repeaters on student outcomes in secondary schools. Using student sur-
veys they identify changes in teachers’ pedagogical practices and increases
in violence and classroom disruptions as important channels. Duﬂo et al.
(2011) ﬁnd in the context of Kenyan primary schools that teachers provide
more effort, as measured by teacher absenteeism, when they are randomly
assigned to a class of high-achieving as compared to low-achieving students.
Taken together, these ﬁndings conﬁrm the notion that the channels, which
depend on the speciﬁc contexts, can create very heterogeneous peer effects.
VIII. Conclusion
This article adds to the discussion about threats to the identiﬁcation of
peer effects and provides empirical evidence of peer effects in higher educa-
tion. In the analytical part of this paper, we have shown that measurement
error can lead to substantial overestimation of peer effects in settings where
peer group assignment is systematic. In settings where peer group assign-
ment is random or based on an observable variable, however, measurement
error will only lead to attenuation bias. These ﬁndings are good news for
past and future peer effects studies that rely on natural random variation
or exploit a perfectly observable assignment mechanism. Peer effects esti-
mates obtained from studies with nonobservable peer group assignment
mechanism have to be interpreted with particular caution since they are
prone to potentially severe upward bias due tomeasurement error. This bias
is not the same as, and may occur on top of, any potential selection bias.
In the empirical part of this paper, we have estimated peer effects in a sam-
ple where university students are randomly assigned to sections. Consistent
with previous research, we ﬁnd effects of average peer quality on student
grades that are small in size but statistically signiﬁcant. These average effects
hide important heterogeneity however.While high- andmiddle-ability stu-
dents beneﬁt from better peers, low-ability students are harmed by their
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high-ability peers. Evidence from students’ course evaluations suggests that
peer effects are driven mainly by changes in group interaction and not by
adjustments in teachers’ behavior or students’ effort.
Our nonlinear estimates suggest that it would be possible to achieve small
overall gains in student performance by reorganizing peer groups. Without
knowing the process that generates the observed peer effects, however, it is
not clear whether this would be welfare enhancing. In principle, increased
student performance can be a result of an increase in efﬁciency or an in-
crease in students’ or teachers’ effort. An increase in student or teacher ef-
fort implies costs which should be weighed against the beneﬁts from in-
creased student performance. If, however, as our results suggest, the
increase in students’ performance is driven by better group interaction, re-
organization of peer groups can lead to higher efﬁciency, and welfare gains
could therefore be possible.
Appendix
A1. Classical Measurement Error and the Estimation of Peer Effects
A1.1. Decomposing p1
We rewrite equation (2) as
p1 5
wIV 2 wOLS
1 2 R2
(A1)
and take this as the starting point to further decompose the peer effects es-
timator based on the data-generating process and variables deﬁned in Sec-
tion II. Here wIV is a two-stage least squares IV estimator. The ﬁrst stage of
this IV regression uses group dummies as instruments for xi, and the pre-
dicted values of this ﬁrst stage are thus group averages of xi. Therefore
wIV is equal to the coefﬁcient from a bivariate regression of yig on xg:
wIV 5
Covðxg, yigÞ
VarðxgÞ
: (A2)
By substituting yig with equation (3) and rearranging, we get:35
wIV 5
Cov xg, d1b0x
*
i 1b1x
*
g 1ui
  
Var xgð Þ
wIV 5 b0
Var x*g
 
VarðxgÞ 1 b1
Var x*g
 
VarðxgÞ :
(A3)
35 Note that
Cov xg, x
*
i
 
5 Var x*g
 
:
.
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Analogously, we can express wOLS:
wOLS 5
Covðxi, yigÞ
Var xið Þ
: (A4)
By substituting yig with equation (3) and rearranging, we get
wOLS 5
Cov xi , d1b0x
*
i 1b1x
*
g 1ui
  
Var xið Þ
wOLS 5 b0
Var x*i
 
Var xið Þ 1 b1
Var x*g
 
Var xið Þ :
(A5)
The R2 from the ﬁrst stage of the above IV estimation is equal to
R2 5
VarðxgÞ
Var xið Þ
: (A6)
Combining all the parts and substituting them into equation (A1), we get:
p15 b0
Var x*g
 
Var xgð Þ 1 b1
Var x*g
 
Var xgð Þ
 
2 b0
Var x*
i
 
Var xið Þ 1 b1
Var x*g
 
Var xið Þ
 
12
Var xgð Þ
Var xið Þ
p1 5 b1f
Varðx*g Þ
VarðxgÞ 2
Varðx*g Þ
Var xið Þ
 
1 b1f
Varðx*g Þ
VarðxgÞ 2
Varðx*i Þ
Var xið Þ
 
p1 5 b1fW 1 b1fQ,
(A7)
where
f 5
1
1 2
Var xgð Þ
Var xið Þ
:
.
A1.2. Understanding the Direction of the Overall Bias
Here we show how measurement error affects fW and fQ.
We start by rewriting fW,
fW 5
1
1 2
Var xgð Þ
Var xið Þ
 Varðx
*
g Þ
VarðxgÞ
2
Varðx*g Þ
Var xið Þ
 !
5
Var x*g
 
Var xgð Þ 2
Var x*g
 
Var xið Þ
 
1 2
Var xgð Þ
Var xið Þ
: (A8)
Because
(A8)
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1 5
Varðx*g Þ
VarðxgÞ
1
VarðεgÞ
VarðxgÞ
,
and
VarðxgÞ
Var xið Þ
5
Varðx*g Þ
Var xið Þ
1
VarðεgÞ
Var xið Þ
,
we can further rewrite fW as follows:
fW 5
Var x*g
 
Var xgð Þ 2
Var x*g
 
Var xið Þ
 	
Var x*g
 
Var xgð Þ 2
Var x*g
 
Var xið Þ
 	
1
D
Var εgð Þ
Var xgð Þ 2
Var εgð Þ
Var xið Þ
E : (A9)
Note that the terms in [. . .] are identical. In the absence of measurement
error (i.e., if Var(εi)5 0), the terms in h . . . i are equal to zero so fW is equal
to 1. In the presence of measurement error, the denominator is larger than
the numerator because VarðεgÞ=VarðxgÞ > VarðεgÞ=VarðxiÞ, and therefore
0 < fW < 1. Note that when students are randomly assigned, fW is equal
to the test reliability of ability Varðx*i Þ=VarðxiÞ.36
Now let us have a look at fQ. If all ability measures have the same var-
iance, we can use the formula for the variance of the mean of correlated var-
iables to rewrite
Var x*g
 
5
Var x*i
 
Ng
1
Ng 2 1
Ng
rVar x*i
 
and
Var xg
 
5
Var x*i
 
Ng
1
Ng 2 1
Ng
rVar x*i
 
1
Var εið Þ
Ng
,
where Ng is the number of students in group g, and r is the average corre-
lation of the distinct student abilities in group g.37 After canceling outNg, we
can rewrite Varðx*g Þ=VarðxgÞ as follows:
36 Note that under random assignment, Varðx*gÞ 5 Varðx*i Þ=Ng and VarðxgÞ 5
Varðx*i Þ=Ng 1 VarðεiÞ=Ng. Plugging these into eq. (A8) and rearranging, you can
see that fW 5 Varðx*i Þ=VarðxiÞ.
37
q 5
1
Ng Ng 2 1
 oNgi≠j Cov x*i , x*j
 
Var x*i
  :
.
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Var x*i
 
1 ðNg 2 1ÞrVar x*i
 
Var x*i
 
1 ðNg 2 1ÞrVar x*i
 
1 Var εið Þ
: (A10)
We can now rewrite Q as follows:
Q 5
Var x*i
 
1 Ng21ð ÞrVar x*i
 
Var x*i
 
1 Ng21ð ÞrVar x*i
 
1Var εið Þ
2
Var x*i
 
Var x*i
 
1Var εið Þ
Q 5
11 Ng21ð Þrð ÞVar x*i
 
11 Ng21ð Þrð ÞVar x*i
 
1Var εið Þ
2
Var x*i
 
Var x*i
 
1Var εið Þ
Q 5
Var x*i
 
Var x*i
 
1 Var εið Þ
11 Ng21ð Þrð Þ
2
Var x*i
 
Var x*i
 
1 Var εið Þ
:
(A11)
Withoutmeasurement error, theﬁrst and the second terms inQ are equal,
and thusQ (and fQ) is equal to zero. With measurement error, the magni-
tudeQ of depends on average correlation of the distinct student abilities r:
under random assignment, r will be equal to zero, both terms in equa-
tion (A11)will be the same, andQwill be zero. If students tend tobegrouped
according to their ability, rwill be positive; the ﬁrst termwill be larger than
the second term in equation (A11), andQ (and fQ) will be positive. Given
that students are systematically assigned to groups, the size ofQ increases
with r, Ng, and b0.
To conclude, in the absence of measurement error, fW is equal to one
and fQ is equal to zero, so p1 is equal to b1. With measurement error, the
sign of the overall bias depends on b1fW and b0fQ. With random assign-
ment (r5 0), fQ is equal to zero, and p1 is attenuated. With systematic as-
signment (r > 0), fQ is positive. The overall size of the bias then depends
on whether the upward bias caused by b0fQ is larger than the downward
bias—assuming that peer effects are positive—caused by b1fW.
A3. Exceptions to the Scheduling Procedure
There are some exceptions to the section assignment procedure described
in Section III.C. First, when the number of late registering student exceeds
the number of empty spots, the scheduler creates a new section that mainly
consists of late-registering students.We excluded eight late-registration sec-
tions from the analysis.38 Second, for some bachelor’s degree courses, there
are special sections consisting mainly of repeating students. Whether a
38 Students who register late, for example, generally have a lower GPA and might
be particularly busy or stressed during the period in which they registered late,
which may also affect their performance. This dynamic might create a spurious re-
lationship between GPA and grades.
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repeater section is created depends on the preference of the course coordi-
nator and the number of repeat students. We excluded 34 repeater sections
from the analysis. Third, in some bachelor’s degree courses, students who
are part of the Maastricht Research Based Learning (MARBLE) program
are assigned to separate sections, where they often are assigned to a more
experienced teacher. Students of this program are typically the highest-
performing students of their cohort. We excluded 15 sections that consist
ofMARBLE students from the analysis.39 Fourth, in six courses, the course
coordinator or other education staff inﬂuenced the section composition.40
We excluded these courses from our analysis. Fifth, some master’s degree
tracks have part-time students. Part-time students are scheduled mostly in
evening classes, and there are special sections with only part-time students.
We excluded 95 part-time students from the analysis. Sixth, we excluded the
ﬁrst-year, ﬁrst-period courses of the two largest bachelor’s degree programs
(International Business and Economics) because in these courses only par-
ticular students, such as repeating students, have previous grades. Seventh,
we excluded sections for which fewer than ﬁve students had a past GPA.
For these courses, peer GPA does not reliably capture the peer quality of
the students in the section. Eighth, we excluded sections with more than
16 students (2%) because the ofﬁcial class size limit according to scheduling
guidelines is 15, and in special cases 16. Sections with more than 16 students
are a result of room availability constraints or special requests from course
coordinators. We also excluded 36 courses from the estimation sample in
which part of the ﬁnal grade might have consisted of group-graded compo-
nents, such as joint papers or other jointly graded projects.
A4. Alternative Test for Random Assignment of Students to Sections
In the spirit of standard randomization checks in experiments, we test
whether section dummies jointly predict student pre-treatment characteristics
when controlling for scheduling and balancing indicators. The pre-treatment
characteristics that we consider are GPA, age, gender, and student ID rank.41
For each course in our sample, we run a regression of pre-treatment charac-
teristics on section dummies as well as scheduling and balancing controls,
and we F-test for joint signiﬁcance of the section dummies. Thus, we run
39 We identiﬁed pure late registration classes, repeater classes, and MARBLE
(Maastricht Research Based Learning) classes from the data. The scheduler con-
ﬁrmed the classes that we identiﬁed as repeater classes. The algorithm by which
we identiﬁed late registration classes andMARBLE classes is available upon request.
40 The schedulers informed us about these courses.
41 For approximately 9% of our sample, mostly exchange students, we do not
know the age, gender, and nationality. In Maastricht University, ID numbers are
increasing in tenure at the university. ID rank is the rank of the ID number. We
use ID rank instead of actual ID because the SBE recently added a new digit to the
ID numbers, which creates a discrete jump in the series.
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approximately 400 regressions for each pre-treatment characteristic. Under
conditional random assignment, the p-values of the F-tests of these regres-
sions should be uniformly distributed with a mean of 0.5 (Murdoch, Tsai,
and Adcock 2008). Furthermore, if students are randomly assigned to sec-
tions within each course, the F-test should reject the null hypothesis of no
relation between section assignment and students’ pre-treatment character-
istics at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% signiﬁcance levels in close to 5%, 1%, and
0.1% of the cases, respectively.
Table A1 shows the number of cases in which the F-test actually rejected
the null hypothesis at the respective levels. Column 1 shows the total num-
ber of course-level regressions for each pre-treatment characteristic. Col-
umn 3 shows that the actual rejection rates at the 5% level are close to the
expected rejection rates under random assignment. The F-tests for the re-
gressions with the dependent variables GPA and age are rejected slightly
more often than 5%, and the rejection rate for the dependent variables gen-
der and ID rank are slightly less than 5%. Columns 5 and 7 show the actual
rejection rates at the 1% and 0.1% levels. Furthermore, these rejection rates
as awhole are close to the expected rates under random assignment, with the
exception of age, where the rejection rates are only slightly higher than we
expected. Table A2 shows that the averages of the p-values of the F-tests
for each characteristic are close to 0.5. Figure A2 conﬁrms that the p-values
are roughly uniformly distributed. All together, we present strong evidence
that section assignment in our estimation sample is random, conditional on
scheduling and balancing indicators.
Table A1
Alternative Randomization Test of Section Assignment
Total
Number
of
Courses
Joint F-Test Is Signiﬁcant at Level:
5% 1% 10%
Dependent
Variable
Number
Signiﬁcant
Percent
Signiﬁcant
Number
Signiﬁcant
Percent
Signiﬁcant
Number
Signiﬁcant
Percent
Signiﬁcant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA 393 23 5.85 6 1.53 1 .25
Age 388 28 7.22 10 2.58 2 .52
Gender 376 12 3.19 2 .53 0 .00
ID rank 393 18 4.59 4 1.02 2 .51
NOTE.—This table is based on separate ordinary least squares regressions with past GPA, age, gender,
and ID rank as dependent variables. GPA5 grade point average. The explanatory variables are a set of sec-
tion dummies, dummies for the other parallel course taken at the same time, and dummies for day and time
of the sessions, German, Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration status. Column 1 shows the
total number of separate regressions. Columns 2, 4, and 6 show in howmany regressions the F-test rejected
the null hypothesis at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. Columns 3, 5, and 7 show for what per-
centage of the regressions the F-test rejected the null hypothesis at the respective levels. Differences in num-
ber of courses are due to missing observations for some of the dependent variables.
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Table A2
Randomization Test: Mean p-Values
Total Number of Courses Mean of p-Value
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
GPA 393 .499
Age 388 .485
Gender 377 .502
ID rank 393 .535
NOTE.—This table is based on the regressions reported in table A1. GPA 5
grade point average.
Table A3
Using First Year GPA as Measure of Own and Peer
Ability
Standardized Course Grade
Standardized ﬁrst year peer GPA .0198**
(.008)
Standardized ﬁrst year GPA .6506***
(.027)
Observations 12,046
R2 .569
Course ﬁxed effects Yes
Staff ﬁxed effects Yes
Other course ﬁxed effects Yes
NOTE.—The dependent variable is the standardized course grade. Additional
controls include dummies for day of the session, time of the session, German,
Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration status. Other course ﬁxed
effects refers to the course that students are taking at the same time. GPA 5
grade point average. Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period
level are in parentheses.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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Table A4
Determinants of Survey Response (OLS)
Response Response
(1) (2)
Standardized peer GPA 2.0015
(.004)
High GPA  Fraction of high-GPA peers 2.0033
(.037)
High GPA  Fraction of low-GPA peers 2.0034
(.034)
Middle GPA  Fraction of high-GPA peers 2.0212
(.034)
Middle GPA  Fraction of low-GPA peers .0292
(.037)
Low GPA  Fraction of high-GPA peers 2.0181
(.027)
Low GPA  Fraction of low-GPA peers 2.0248
(.029)
Standardized GPA .0722*** .0607***
(.0038) (.0056)
F-statistic joined signiﬁcance of peer variables .45
Prob > F .8456
Number of observations 45,332 45,332
R2 .104 .104
NOTE.—Both regressions include ﬁxed effects for the course, ﬁxed effects for the other courses taken at
the same time, and teacher ﬁxed effects. All speciﬁcations include dummies for day of the session, time of
the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration status. GPA 5 grade point av-
erage. Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses.
*** p < .01.
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Table A7
The Effect of Peer Composition on Student Evaluations (Without Bounding
or Imputations)
Standardized Group
Interaction
Self-Study
Hours
Standardized Teacher
Functioning
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
Standardized peer GPA .0550*** .0433 .0010
(.015) (.092) (.013)
Standardized GPA 2.0358*** .0530 2.0466***
(.010) (.088) (.009)
15,285 15,232 14,654
Observations .222 .267 .387
Panel B:
High GPA  Fraction of
high-GPA peers .5297*** 2.7109 .0820
(.131) (.799) (.099)
High GPA  Fraction of
low-GPA peers 2.1180 2.8725 2.0830
(.120) (.766) (.101)
Middle GPA  Fraction of
high-GPA peers .1881 .0058 2.0492
(.141) (.991) (.127)
Middle GPA  Fraction of
low-GPA peers .0230 1.7851* .0410
(.112) (.946) (.118)
Low GPA  Fraction of
high-GPA peers .2727** 2.2952 .0609
(.119) (.978) (.119)
Low GPA  Fraction of
low-GPA peers .0454 21.4976 2.0665
(.121) (.967) (.120)
Observations 15,285 15,232 14,654
F-statistic joined signiﬁcance
of peer variables .224 .268 .388
Prob > F < .0001 .2169 .5226
NOTE.—All regressions include ﬁxed effects for the course, ﬁxed effects for the other course taken at the
same time, and teacher ﬁxed effects. The dependent variables are standardized group interaction in col. 1,
self-study hours in col. 2, and standardized teacher evaluation in col. 3. All speciﬁcations include dummies
for day of the session, time of the session, German, Dutch, exchange student status, and late registration
status. Robust standard errors clustered at the course-year-period level are in parentheses.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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FIG. A1.—Screenshot of the scheduling program used by the SBE Scheduling
Department. This screenshot shows the scheduling program Plus Enterprise Time-
table©.
FIG. A2.—Distribution of F-test p-values as reported in table A1. These are his-
tograms with p-values from all the regressions reported in table A1. The vertical
line in each histogram shows the .05 signiﬁcance level. A color version of this ﬁgure
is available online.
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